The Cat and Mouse in Split Manufacturing
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© 1993-2012 IEEE. Split manufacturing of integrated circuits eliminates vulnerabilities introduced by an untrusted foundry by manufacturing only a part of the target design at an untrusted high-end foundry and the remaining part at a trusted low-end foundry. Most researchers have focused on attack and defenses for hierarchical designs and/or use a relatively high-end trusted foundry, leading to high cost. We propose an attack and defense for split manufacturing for flattened designs. Our attack uses a network-flow model and outperforms previous attacks. We also develop two defense techniques using placement perturbation - one using physical design information and the other using logical information - while considering overhead. The effectiveness of our techniques is demonstrated on benchmark circuits.
author list (cited authors)
Wang, Y., Chen, P. u., Hu, J., Li, G., & Rajendran, J.