selected publications academic article Rogers, J. R., & Ura, J. D. (2020). A majoritarian basis for judicial countermajoritarianism. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 32(3), 435-459. Rogers, J. R. (2012). Democracy and Necessity: Rightly Dividing Political Power. L'Europe en Formation. n° 363(1), 73-93. Rogers, J. R., & Vanberg, G. (2007). Resurrecting Lochner: A defense of unprincipled judicial activism. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization. 23(2), 442-468. Dowding, K., & Rogers, J. R (2007). Editorial. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 19(1), 7-8. Rogers, J. R (2006). The Law and Policy of State Tax Competition: Much Ado about Nothing Symposium: DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno and the Constitutionality of State Tax Incentives for Economic Development. 4, 101-118. Rogers, J. R. (2005). The impact of divided government on legislative production. Public Choice. 123(1-2), 217-233. Rogers, J. R. (2003). The impact of bicameralism on legislative production. LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY. 28(4), 509-528. Rogers, J. R. (2003). Constitutional process: A social choice analysis of Supreme Court decision making. Public Choice. 115(3), 501-506. Carrubba, C., & Rogers, J. R. (2003). National judicial power and the dormant Commerce Clause. Journal of Law, Economics & Organization. 19(2), 543-570. Carrubba, C., & Rogers, J. R. (2003). National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause. 19(2), 543-570. Rogers, J. R. (2002). Free riding in state legislatures. Public Choice. 113(1-2), 59-76. Rogers, J. R., & Vanberg, G. (2002). Judicial advisory opinions and legislative outcomes in comparative perspective. American Journal of Political Science (AJPS). 46(2), 379-397. Rogers, J. R. (2001). An informational rationale for congruent bicameralism. Journal of Theoretical Politics. 13(2), 123-151. Rogers, J. R. (2001). Information and judicial review: A signaling game of legislative-judicial interaction. American Journal of Political Science (AJPS). 45(1), 84-99. Rogers, J. R. (2000). The courts of international trade: Judicial specialization, expertise, and bureaucratic policy-making. Public Choice. 103(3-4), 393-398. Rogers, J. R. (2000). The Effectiveness and Constitutionality of State Tax Incentive Policies for Locating Businesses: A Simple Game Theoretic Analysis. Tax Lawyer. 53(2), 431-458. Rogers, J. R (1999). Judicial Review Standards in Unicameral Legislative Systems: A Positive Theoretic and Historical Analysis Annual Nebraska Survey. Creighton Law Review. 33, 65-120. Rogers, J. R. (1999). Legislative incentives and two-tiered judicial review: A game theoretic reading of Carolene Products footnote four. American Journal of Political Science (AJPS). 43(4), 1096-1121. Rogers, J. R. (1998). Nationalism and rationality. Public Choice. 95(3-4), 418-422. Rogers, J. R. (1998). Bicameral sequence: Theory and state legislative evidence. American Journal of Political Science (AJPS). 42(4), 1025-1060. book Rogers, J. R., Flemming, R. B., & Bond, J. R. (2012). Institutional games and the U.S. Supreme Court chapter Rogers, J. R. (2015). The Gimlet-Eye of Social Science. Reno, R. R., & McClay, B. (Eds.), Religion and the Social Sciences: Conversations with Robert Bellah and Christian Smith. (pp. 88-99). Wipf and Stock Publishers. Carrubba, C. J., & Rogers, J. R. (2012). Court-state interactions: National judicial power and the dormant commerce clause. Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court. (pp. 117-143). Rogers, J. R. (2012). Why expert judges defer to (almost) ignorant legislators: Accounting for the puzzle of judicial deference. Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court. (pp. 44-62). Rogers, J. R. (2006). Why Expert Judges Defer to (Almost) Ignorant Legislators Accounting for the Puzzle of Judicial Deference. INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT. (pp. 24-42). Rogers, J. R. (2006). A Primer on Game Theory. INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT. (pp. 275-296). University of Virginia Press. ROGERS, J. R (2006). Accounting for the Puzzle of Judicial Deference. Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court. (pp. 24-42). University of Virginia Press. Carrubba, C. J., & Rogers, J. R. (2006). Court-State Interactions National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause. INSTITUTIONAL GAMES AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT. (pp. 97-123). CARRUBBA, C. J., & ROGERS, J. R (2006). National Judicial Power and the Dormant Commerce Clause. Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court. (pp. 97-124). University of Virginia Press. Rogers, J. R. (1997). Civil Rights and Liberties in the Vocabulary of the American Founding. Palm, D. C. (Eds.), On Faith and Free Government. (pp. 61-76). Rowman & Littlefield. conference paper Rogers, J. R. (2005). Empirical determinants of bicameral sequence in state legislatures. LEGISLATIVE STUDIES QUARTERLY. 29-42.
teaching activities POLS206 Amer Natnl Govt Instructor POLS207 State & Local Govt Instructor POLS308 Game Theoretic Methods In Pols Instructor POLS353 Const Rts & Liberties Instructor POLS355 U S Constitutional Dev Instructor POLS461 Jurisprudence Instructor POLS497 Hnr-independ Honors Stdies Instructor POLS672 American Pol Institutions Instructor POLS685 Directed Studies Instructor POLS691 Research Instructor
chaired theses and dissertations Conway, Nicholas David (2016-12). Rush to Justice: The Disappearing Civil Trial. Craig, Mckinzie (2012-10). Legal Doctrine and Self Imposed Norms: Examining the Politics of Stare Decisis. Morin, Alexander (2012-02). Situational Hitting: Strategic Lobbying in a Strategic Legislative Environment.
education and training Ph.D. in Political Science, University of Iowa - (Iowa City, Iowa, United States) 1994 M.A. in Economics, Brown University - (Providence, Rhode Island, United States) 1989 J.D. in Law, University of Nebraska–Lincoln - (Lincoln, United States) 1987 B.A., University of Nebraska–Lincoln - (Lincoln, United States) 1983
awards and honors Fellow, conferred by Claremont Institute - (Claremont, California, United States), 1988
mailing address Texas A&M University Department of Political Science MS 4348 College Station, TX 77843-4348 USA