A majoritarian basis for judicial countermajoritarianism Academic Article

abstract

• Judicial protection of disfavored minorities against oppressive legislation in majoritarian separation-of-power systems raises a puzzle: Why dont legislative majorities enacting discriminatory legislation curb judicial power when judges use their power to protect minorities and stymie the legislation? We answer this question by showing that judicial protection of disfavored minorities can emerge as an unintended by-product of majoritarian politics. We develop a model that includes the two aspects of judicial review Alexander Hamilton discusses in The Federalist No. 78: Judicial protection of disfavored minorities against hostile popular majorities, and judicial protection of majority interests against legislative depredation. It is the institutional linkage between these functions that induces popular majorities, within limits, to side with judges against legislatures even when those judges protect minorities that popular majorities want to oppress.

authors

• Rogers, James

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS

altmetric score

• 19

author list (cited authors)

• Rogers, J. R., & Ura, J. D.

citation count

• 4

complete list of authors

• Rogers, James R||Ura, Joseph Daniel

publication date

• July 2020

publisher

• SAGE Publications  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Theoretical Politics  Journal

keywords

• Countermajoritarianism
• Judicial Review
• Legislatures
• Minority Protection
• Separation-of-powers

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1177/0951629820927784

start page

• 435

end page

• 459

volume

• 32

issue

• 3

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0951629820927784

user-defined tag

• 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions