Aggregate and individual effects of information in a coordination (traffic) game Academic Article

abstract

• AbstractUsing an existing coordination (traffic) experiment, we investigate information's effect on traffic congestion when subjects already have a history of past play. In contrast to previous studies, our interventions neither alter aggregate nor individual payoffs. A second study isolates individualsubject response to information using a fixed distribution of past subjects. We find information alters subject play: subjects switch roads more often and receive higher payoffs conditional on switching roads. Because switching reduces payoffs unconditionally, information does not generally improve payoffs overall. Only subjects that receive information upon starting the game appear to increase their payoffs due to the information treatment.

authors

• Brown, Alexander
• Burris, Mark

published proceedings

• ECONOMIC INQUIRY

altmetric score

• 1.85

author list (cited authors)

• Ashraf, S., Brown, A., Burris, M., & Vitaku, V.

citation count

• 0

complete list of authors

• Ashraf, Sruthi||Brown, Alexander LL||Burris, Mark WW||Vitaku, Valon

publication date

• October 2023

publisher

• Wiley  Publisher

published in

• ECONOMIC INQUIRY  Journal

keywords

• Coordination Games
• Experimental Economics
• Traffic

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1111/ecin.13143

start page

• 818

end page

• 850

volume

• 61

issue

• 4

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecin.13143