The Impact of Strategic Persistence on Executive Compensation Academic Article

abstract

• This study investigates whether different participants in corporate governance reward strategic persistence through executive compensation. Internal participants (inside directors, CEOs/ chairs, and corporate officers who own a significant proportion of company stock) are expected to favor stability and therefore reward persistence, whereas external participants (large block shareholders) are predicted to favor change and therefore penalize persistence. Results suggest that the presence of CEOs/chairs leads to rewarding strategic persistence with total compensation. Inside directors also appear to reward persistence with fixed compensation. Large external shareholders,contrary to expectations, seem to reward persistence with higher levels of fixed compensation.

authors

• Cannella, Albert

published proceedings

• Journal of Management

author list (cited authors)

• Grossman, W., & Cannella, A. A.

citation count

• 24

complete list of authors

• Grossman, Wayne||Cannella, Albert A

publication date

• April 2006

publisher

• SAGE Publications  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Management  Journal

keywords

• 35 Commerce, Management, Tourism And Services
• 3501 Accounting, Auditing And Accountability
• 3502 Banking, Finance And Investment
• 3507 Strategy, Management And Organisational Behaviour

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1177/0149206305280105

start page

• 257

end page

• 278

volume

• 32

issue

• 2

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206305280105