The role of risk in executive compensation Academic Article

abstract

• The present study was designed to investigate the role of risk in executive compensation. We argue that compensation arrangements may be used to mitigate agency problems by encouraging risk taking behavior and providing incentives for optimizing long-term performance. We examine total compensation, compensation risk, and compensation time horizon. Consistent with our theory, the evidence indicates that these dimensions vary with the financial and strategic context of the firm and with the risk-taking propensity of the CEO.

authors

• Cannella, Albert

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT

author list (cited authors)

• Gray, S. R., & Cannella, A. A.

citation count

• 133

complete list of authors

• Gray, SR||Cannella, AA

publication date

• August 1997

publisher

• SAGE Publications  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Management  Journal

keywords

• 35 Commerce, Management, Tourism And Services
• 3502 Banking, Finance And Investment
• 3507 Strategy, Management And Organisational Behaviour
• Behavioral And Social Science

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/S0149-2063(97)90046-5

start page

• 517

end page

• 540

volume

• 23

issue

• 4

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014920639702300402