Full Implementation under Ambiguity Academic Article

abstract

• This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value. (JEL D71, D81, D82)

authors

• Guo, Huiyi

published proceedings

• American Economic Journal Microeconomics

altmetric score

• 3.35

author list (cited authors)

• Guo, H., & Yannelis, N. C.

citation count

• 6

complete list of authors

• Guo, Huiyi||Yannelis, Nicholas C

publication date

• February 2021

publisher

• American Economic Association  Publisher

published in

• American Economic Journal: Microeconomics  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1257/mic.20180184

start page

• 148

end page

• 178

volume

• 13

issue

• 1

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180184