Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings Academic Article

abstract

• Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even when the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitation can yield equilibria where agents have a strict incentive to be untruthful. This occurs only under incomplete information, when an agent anticipates that truthful reporting would signal false private information about others preferences. We provide conditions ruling out this phenomenon, guaranteeing all equilibrium outcomes to be welfare-equivalent to truthful ones. (JEL C73, D45, D82, D83)

authors

• Velez, Rodrigo

published proceedings

• AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS

author list (cited authors)

• Schummer, J., & Velez, R. A.

citation count

• 2

complete list of authors

• Schummer, James||Velez, Rodrigo A

publication date

• February 2021

publisher

• American Economic Association  Publisher

published in

• American Economic Journal: Microeconomics  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1257/mic.20180065

start page

• 116

end page

• 147

volume

• 13

issue

• 1

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180065