Cable Capacitance Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • 2015 by the authors. The security of the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-(like)-noise (KLJN) key exchange system is based on the fluctuation-dissipation theorem of classical statistical physics. Similarly to quantum key distribution, in practical situations, due to the non-idealities of the building elements, there is a small information leak, which can be mitigated by privacy amplification or other techniques so that unconditional (information-theoretic) security is preserved. In this paper, the industrial cable and circuit simulator LTSPICE is used to validate the information leak due to one of the non-idealities in KLJN, the parasitic (cable) capacitance. Simulation results show that privacy amplification and/or capacitor killer (capacitance compensation) arrangements can effectively eliminate the leak.

published proceedings

  • INFORMATION

altmetric score

  • 2.25

author list (cited authors)

  • Chen, H., Gonzalez, E., Saez, Y., & Kish, L. B.

citation count

  • 16

complete list of authors

  • Chen, Hsien-Pu||Gonzalez, Elias||Saez, Yessica||Kish, Laszlo B

publication date

  • January 2015

publisher