CURRENT INJECTION ATTACK AGAINST THE KLJN SECURE KEY EXCHANGE

abstract

• 2016 Polish Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved. The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) scheme is a statistical/physical secure key exchange system based on the laws of classical statistical physics to provide unconditional security. We used the LTSPICE industrial cable and circuit simulator to emulate one of the major active (invasive) attacks, the current injection attack, against the ideal and a practical KLJN system, respectively. We show that two security enhancement techniques, namely, the instantaneous voltage/current comparison method, and a simple privacy amplification scheme, independently and effectively eliminate the information leak and successfully preserve the systems unconditional security.

authors

• Kish, Laszlo

published proceedings

• METROLOGY AND MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS

author list (cited authors)

• Chen, H., Mohammad, M., & Kish, L. B.

citation count

• 17

complete list of authors

• Chen, Hsien-Pu||Mohammad, Muneer||Kish, Laszlo B

publication date

• June 2016

publisher

• DE GRUYTER  Publisher

published in

• Metrology and Measurement Systems  Journal

keywords

• Current Injection Attack
• Kljn
• Privacy Amplification
• Secure Key Exchange
• Unconditional Security

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1515/mms-2016-0025

start page

• 173

end page

• 181

volume

• 23

issue

• 2