CEO DUALITY AND BOARD ATTENTION TO MONITORING AND CONTROL. Conference Paper

abstract

• This study examines the influence of CEO duality on board attention to monitoring and control role. We draw upon agency theory and the attention based view to argue that CEO-chairs are able to utilize their formal authority to direct the board of director's attention away from monitoring and control issues. The theory developed in this study was tested on a longitudinal sample of 183 firms from the furniture manufacturing, rubber and plastics, and electronics industries. The results suggest that when faced with the threat of poor performance CEO-chairs act to reduce board attention to monitoring and control. Moreover, our results generally suggest that CEO-chairs utilize their control over board meeting location and board meeting agenda detail as entrenchment mechanisms to focus board attention on issues other than monitoring and control.

authors

• Bierman, Leonard

published proceedings

• Academy of Management Proceedings

author list (cited authors)

• TUGGLE, C. S., REUTZEL, C. R., & BIERMAN, L.

citation count

• 7

complete list of authors

• TUGGLE, CHRISTOPHER S||REUTZEL, CHRISTOPHER R||BIERMAN, LEONARD

publication date

• August 2008

publisher

• Academy of Management  Publisher

published in

• Academy of Management Proceedings  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.5465/ambpp.2008.33629941

start page

• 1

end page

• 6

volume

• 2008

issue

• 1

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2008.33629941