CEO DUALITY AND BOARD ATTENTION TO MONITORING AND CONTROL.
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This study examines the influence of CEO duality on board attention to monitoring and control role. We draw upon agency theory and the attention based view to argue that CEO-chairs are able to utilize their formal authority to direct the board of director's attention away from monitoring and control issues. The theory developed in this study was tested on a longitudinal sample of 183 firms from the furniture manufacturing, rubber and plastics, and electronics industries. The results suggest that when faced with the threat of poor performance CEO-chairs act to reduce board attention to monitoring and control. Moreover, our results generally suggest that CEO-chairs utilize their control over board meeting location and board meeting agenda detail as entrenchment mechanisms to focus board attention on issues other than monitoring and control.
author list (cited authors)
TUGGLE, C. S., REUTZEL, C. R., & BIERMAN, L.