Dual ownership, returns, and voting in mergers Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • 2016. In Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) a significant proportion of targets' equity is owned by financial institutions that simultaneously own targets' bonds ("dual holders"). Targets with larger equity ownership by dual holders have lower M&A equity premia and larger abnormal bond returns, particularly when dual holders stand to benefit more from appreciation of their bond stakes, e.g., when their bond ownership in the target is large and the target credit rating is non-investment grade. Dual holders are more likely to vote in favor of the merger proposal. Our results suggest the presence of coordination of decisions within dual holding financial conglomerates in M&A targets.

published proceedings

  • JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS

altmetric score

  • 1

author list (cited authors)

  • Bodnaruk, A., & Rossi, M.

citation count

  • 39

complete list of authors

  • Bodnaruk, Andriy||Rossi, Marco

publication date

  • January 2016