Optimal inside debt compensation and the value of equity and debt Academic Article

abstract

• 2015 Elsevier B.V. We use firm and chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics motivated by optimal contracting theory to estimate optimal CEO relative debt-equity incentive ratios. Equity values rise as firms adjust CEO incentive ratios toward their predicted optimums, whether that increases or decreases the relative incentive ratio. Debt values rise as firms adjust ratios upward and do not fall as they adjust them downward. Our predicted optimums explain changes in equity and debt values better than a model in which firms simply match CEO inside debt-equity ratios to firm debt-equity ratios. The results suggest important cross-sectional differences in firms' optimal inside debt policies.

authors

• Johnson, Shane

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS

author list (cited authors)

• Campbell, T. C., Galpin, N., & Johnson, S. A.

citation count

• 43

complete list of authors

• Campbell, T Colin||Galpin, Neal||Johnson, Shane A

publication date

• January 2016

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Financial Economics  Journal

keywords

• Executive Compensation
• Incentives
• Inside Debt
• Pensions

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.09.003

start page

• 336

end page

• 352

volume

• 119

issue

• 2

URL

• http%3A%2F%2Fdx.doi.org%2F10.1016%2Fj.jfineco.2015.09.003