The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems Academic Article

abstract

• 2016 Elsevier Inc. In experimental partnership dissolution problems with complete information, the divide-and-choose mechanism is significantly superior to the winner's-bid auction. The performance of divide-and-choose is mainly affected by reciprocity issues and not by bounded rationality. The performance of the winner's-bid auction is significantly affected by bounded rationality. Contrary to theoretical predictions divide-and-choose exhibits no first-mover bias.

authors

• Brown, Alexander
• Velez, Rodrigo

published proceedings

• GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR

author list (cited authors)

• Brown, A. L., & Velez, R. A.

citation count

• 8

complete list of authors

• Brown, Alexander L||Velez, Rodrigo A

publication date

• March 2016

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Games and Economic Behavior  Journal

keywords

• Behavioral Mechanism Design
• Divide-and-choose
• Experimental Economics
• No-envy
• Winner's-bid Auction

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.008

start page

• 115

end page

• 131

volume

• 96

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.01.008