The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the effective design of coercion strategies from the perspective of the coercing country in international conflict negotiations. The dissertation seeks to validate the argument that combining carrots with the threat of coercion increases the probability of success by examining military coercion, economic coercion, and denuclearization agreements. Each chapter of the dissertation presents comprehensive theories and empirical evidence that strongly support this argument. The carrot policy is shown to offer a face-saving exit strategy to the target by rationalizing some degree of submission to coercion. In this scenario, it would be feasible to encourage the submission of the target, which would otherwise not have yielded. By openly promising the carrots and sticks when a coercive threat is issued, the credibility of the realization of the carrots and sticks can be strengthened. It is important to note, however, that if the coercion has already been implemented and the coercer is incurring implementation costs, the use of carrots may undermine the negative tone of the coercion strategy and adversely affect the probability of success. Nonetheless, the study suggests that the use of carrots can further reinforce the effectiveness of coercion, when combined with the threat of force, by signaling the coercer's strong commitment to implementing the policy. The dissertation offers implications for the use of simultaneous carrot-and-stick approaches in achieving successful militarized compellence and economic sanctions threats. It also provides specific negotiation strategies, particularly in the context of denuclearization, that aim to target the motivation for nuclear development stemming from security concerns vulnerability. Ultimately, the effective design of successful coercion strategies can contribute to the establishment and maintenance of a peaceful world order by increasing the success rate of coercive threats, which in turn reduces the likelihood of resorting to actual military force.
