THE POLITICS OF COURT STRUCTURE: The Addition of New Federal Judges, 1949–1978 Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • This article analyzes the effects of party control of the Presidency and Congress, and timing during the President's term on the success of proposals to add new federal judges. Proposals for new judges are more likely to pass if the same party controls the Presidency and Congress than if different parties are in power, and proposals are more likely to pass during the first two years of the President's term than during the second two years. Party control exerts a stronger influence than timing. We also find that the variables interact to produce their influence—the only real chance of adding new judges occurs if the same party controls the Presidency and Congress, and the proposal comes early in the President's term. Under all other conditions, the probability of success is small. Copyright © 1980, Wiley Blackwell. All rights reserved

author list (cited authors)

  • BOND, J. R.

citation count

  • 6

publication date

  • April 1980

publisher