AN ECONOMIC-MODEL OF VOTING-BEHAVIOR OVER SPECIFIC ISSUES AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787 Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • Despite hundreds of studies of the influence of economic interests on the formation of the U.S. Constitution, no consensus has been reached. Our study of the Constitutional Convention differs from previous ones by offering an explicit theoretical model of delegates' voting behavior and employing multivariate statistical techniques. We extend our earlier work by analyzing new information on constituents' economic interests and ideology. Further our econometric results on individual roll-call votes strongly suggest delegates who owned slaves or represented slaveowning constituents were more likely to oppose issues favoring a national form of government.

published proceedings

  • JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY

altmetric score

  • 3.5

author list (cited authors)

  • MCGUIRE, R. A., & OHSFELDT, R. L.

citation count

  • 53

complete list of authors

  • MCGUIRE, RA||OHSFELDT, RL

publication date

  • March 1986