Do "any willing provider" and "freedom of choice" laws affect HMO market share? Academic Article

abstract

• This study examines the effects of "any willing provider" (AWP) and "freedom of choice" (FOC) laws on the market share of health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in metropolitan statistical areas over the period 1989-95. We use pooled cross-section time-series regression techniques with year and state fixed effects. HMO market share is hypothesized to be a function of state laws, market characteristics, and state preference for managed care regulation. AWP and FOC laws are characterized by three alternative measures of regulatory intensity. The results suggest that FOC laws have a greater impact on market share than do AWP laws. More comprehensive regulation has a bigger impact than less encompassing laws, and laws limiting selective contracting with physicians are more effective in reducing HMO market share than are laws covering hospitals or pharmacies.

authors

• Morrisey, Michael
• Ohsfeldt, Robert

published proceedings

• Inquiry

altmetric score

• 3

author list (cited authors)

• Morrisey, M. A., & Ohsfeldt, R. L.

citation count

• 7

complete list of authors

• Morrisey, Michael A||Ohsfeldt, Robert L

publication date

• November 2003

publisher

• SAGE Publications  Publisher

published in

• INQUIRY: The Journal of Health Care Organization, Provision, and Financing  Journal

keywords

• Contract Services
• Economic Competition
• Health Care Sector
• Health Maintenance Organizations
• Health Services Accessibility
• Health Services Research
• Humans
• Models, Econometric
• Patient Freedom Of Choice Laws
• Preferred Provider Organizations
• Regression Analysis
• United States
• Urban Health Services

PubMed Central ID

• 15055835

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.5034/inquiryjrnl_40.4.362

start page

• 362

end page

• 374

volume

• 40

issue

• 4

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.5034/inquiryjrnl_40.4.362