One common complaint about the United States Air Force is its overreliance on strategic bombing theory. This dissertation examines that complaint by expounding on the intellectual community within the officer corps during the tumultuous Vietnam War. The sources used include academic theses written by mid to senior field grade officers, articles published in the Air Force's scholarly journal, and articles published by the service's lobbying organization, the Air Force Association. Three schools of thought may be distilled that focused on strategic bombing, the primacy of technology over strategy, and the proper role of airpower to support wars short of a general, nuclear war. These schools are respectively termed strategic warriors, technologists, and tactical warriors. During the Vietnam War, the influence of these intellectual groups shifted. Beginning in 1960, the strategic warriors and technologists were dominant. The strategic warriors advocated their beliefs that nuclear superiority and threatening massive retaliation could prevent and win wars. The technologists enjoyed support during the space race and believed technological breakthroughs would reshape warfare. Both these schools rested on abstract predictions that gave way to the experience of a limited, non-nuclear war the military faced in Vietnam from 1965 through 1973. By the end of the war, the situation had changed. Technologists were the junior school. The tactical warriors now had at least an equal voice with the strategic warriors.
