Zang, Hailing (2005-08). Essays on empirical analysis of multi-unit auctions -- impacts of financial transmission rights on the restructured electricity industry. Doctoral Dissertation. Thesis uri icon

abstract

  • This dissertation uses recently developed empirical methodologies for the study of multi-unit auctions to test the impacts of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the competitiveness of restructured electricity markets. FTRs are a special type of financial option that hedge against volatility in the cost of transporting electricity over the grid. Policy makers seek to use the prices of FTRs as market signals to incentivize efficient investment and utilization of transmission capacity. However, prices will not send the correct signals if market participants strategically use FTRs. This dissertation uses data from the Texas electricity market to test whether the prices of FTRs are efficient to achieve such goals. The auctions studied are multiunit, uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions. The first part of the dissertation studies the auctions on the spot market of the wholesale electricity industry. I derive structural empirical models to test theoretical predictions as to whether bidders fully internalize the effect of FTRs on profits into their bidding decisions. I find that bidders are learning as to how to optimally bid above marginal cost for their inframarginal capacities. The bidders also learn to bid to include FTRs into their profit maximization problem during the course of the first year. But starting from the second year, they deviated from optimal bidding that includes FTRs in the profit maximization problems. Counterfactual analysis show that the primary effect of FTRs on market outcomes is changing the level of prices rather than production efficiency. Finally, I find that in most months, the current allocations of FTRs are statistically equivalent to the optimal allocations. The second part of the dissertation studies the bidding behavior in the FTR auctions. I find that FTRs?? strategic impact on the FTR purchasing behavior is significant for large bidders ?? firms exercising market power in the FTR auctions. Second, trader forecasts future FTR credit very accurately while large generators?? forecasts of future FTR credit tends to be biased upward. Finally, The bid shading patterns are consistent with theoretical predictions and support the existence of common values.
  • This dissertation uses recently developed empirical methodologies for the study
    of multi-unit auctions to test the impacts of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs)
    on the competitiveness of restructured electricity markets. FTRs are a special type
    of financial option that hedge against volatility in the cost of transporting electricity
    over the grid. Policy makers seek to use the prices of FTRs as market signals to
    incentivize efficient investment and utilization of transmission capacity. However,
    prices will not send the correct signals if market participants strategically use FTRs.
    This dissertation uses data from the Texas electricity market to test whether the
    prices of FTRs are efficient to achieve such goals. The auctions studied are multiunit,
    uniform-price, sealed-bid auctions.
    The first part of the dissertation studies the auctions on the spot market of the
    wholesale electricity industry. I derive structural empirical models to test theoretical
    predictions as to whether bidders fully internalize the effect of FTRs on profits into
    their bidding decisions. I find that bidders are learning as to how to optimally bid
    above marginal cost for their inframarginal capacities. The bidders also learn to bid
    to include FTRs into their profit maximization problem during the course of the first
    year. But starting from the second year, they deviated from optimal bidding that
    includes FTRs in the profit maximization problems. Counterfactual analysis show that the primary effect of FTRs on market outcomes is changing the level of prices
    rather than production efficiency. Finally, I find that in most months, the current
    allocations of FTRs are statistically equivalent to the optimal allocations.
    The second part of the dissertation studies the bidding behavior in the FTR
    auctions. I find that FTRs?? strategic impact on the FTR purchasing behavior is
    significant for large bidders ?? firms exercising market power in the FTR auctions.
    Second, trader forecasts future FTR credit very accurately while large generators??
    forecasts of future FTR credit tends to be biased upward. Finally, The bid shading
    patterns are consistent with theoretical predictions and support the existence of
    common values.

publication date

  • August 2005