Whistleblowing and the incentive to hire Academic Article uri icon


  • AbstractWe consider a previously neglected cost of whistleblower awards: employers may base their hiring decisions, on the margin, not on the productivity of an employee but rather on the probability that the employee will become a whistleblower. We develop a threestage model to examine how productivity losses due to distortions at the hiring stage influence optimal whistleblower rewards. We characterize optimal rewards for whistleblowing, and show that when rewards can be chosen according to either the benefits of the employer from offending or the productivity of the worker being hired, productivitybased rewards are superior to benefitbased rewards.

published proceedings

  • Economic Inquiry

altmetric score

  • 0.5

author list (cited authors)

  • De Mot, J., & Mungan, M. C.

citation count

  • 0

complete list of authors

  • De Mot, Jef||Mungan, Murat C