When Do Leaders FreeRide? Business Experience and Contributions to Collective Defense Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • AbstractThe logic of freeriding expects that individuals will underinvest in public goods, but people often behave in ways that are inconsistent with this prediction. Why do we observe variation in freeriding behavior? This study addresses this question by examining contributions to an important international public goodcollective defense in military alliances. It develops a behavioral theory of freeriding in which the beliefs of world leaders are important for explaining investments in public goods. The argument holds that leaders with business experience make smaller contributions to collective defense because they are egoistic and more comfortable relying on a powerful ally for their defense. An analysis of defense expenditures in 17 nonU.S. members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from 1952 to 2014 provides evidence consistent with the theory. The findings suggest that leaders with business experience are more likely than other heads of government to act as selfinterested utilitymaximizers.

published proceedings

  • American Journal of Political Science

altmetric score

  • 31.9

author list (cited authors)

  • Fuhrmann, M.

citation count

  • 34

complete list of authors

  • Fuhrmann, Matthew

publication date

  • April 2020

publisher