Private protection against crime and public policing: Political economy considerations Academic Article

abstract

• Private protection and public policing interact in combatting property crime. While private protection can be tailored to property values by owners, the level of public policing is chosen by elected officials for society as a whole. When the median voters property is less valuable than the average property value, the equilibrium level of public policing is excessive (too small), compared to the level that maximizes the collective welfare of property owners, when private protection and public policing are substitutes (complements); but this relationship can be reversed when offenders utilities are included in the social welfare function.

authors

• Mungan, Murat

published proceedings

• ECONOMICS LETTERS

author list (cited authors)

• Friehe, T., & Mungan, M. C.

citation count

• 1

complete list of authors

• Friehe, Tim||Mungan, Murat C

publication date

• November 2022

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Economics Letters  Journal

keywords

• Crime
• Private Protection
• Public Policing
• Theft

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110858

URI

• https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/1829

start page

• 110858

end page

• 110858

volume

• 220

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110858