ON NASH-IMPLEMENTATION IN THE PRESENCE OF WITHHOLDING

abstract

• In this paper we construct a completely feasible and continuous mechanism whose Nash allocations coincide with Lindahl allocations when both preferences and initial endowments are unknown to the designer and unreported endowments are withheld. This mechanism extends the mechanism of Hong by allowing for semi-positivity of endowments for private goods economies and the mechanism of Tian by allowing for any number of private goods for public goods economies. Thus our mechanism improves all the existing mechanisms that implement Walrasian or Lindahl allocations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D6l, D78, H41. 1995 Academic Press. All rights reserved.

authors

• Li, Qi
• Tian, Guoqiang

published proceedings

• GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR

author list (cited authors)

• TIAN, G. Q., & LI, Q.

citation count

• 12

complete list of authors

• TIAN, GQ||LI, Q

publication date

• January 1995

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Games and Economic Behavior  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1006/game.1995.1017

start page

• 222

end page

• 233

volume

• 9

issue

• 2

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1017