An empirical model of Presidential popularity and Presidential discretion in trade restrictions Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • The behavior of identifiable groups in the political market for protection is gaining increased attention because of the rent-seeking implications. Given the indivisibilities in foreign policy decision making and trade policies, the position of the United States President in the market for trade restrictions is especially unique. This paper investigates empirically the President's behavior in international trade restrictions. Results indicate that popular macroeconomic variables are less important than personality factors in explaining Presidential popularity, and that endogenous popularity is not an important determinant in the Presidential decision to impose trade restrictions. 1992.

published proceedings

  • European Journal of Political Economy

author list (cited authors)

  • Boadu, F. O., Ruppel, F. J., & Angel, A. L.

citation count

  • 1

complete list of authors

  • Boadu, Fred O||Ruppel, Fred J||Angel, Amy L

publication date

  • January 1992