Consequentialism in infinite worlds Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • Abstract We show that in infinite worlds the following three conditions are incompatible: (1) The spatiotemporal ordering of individuals is morally irrelevant. (2) All else being equal, the act of bringing about a good outcome with a high probability is better than the act of bringing about the same outcome with a low probability. (3) One act is better than another only if there is a nonzero probability that it brings about a better outcome. The impossibility of combining these conditions shows that it is more costly to endorse (1) than has been previously acknowledged.

published proceedings

  • ANALYSIS

author list (cited authors)

  • Jonsson, A., & Peterson, M.

citation count

  • 5

complete list of authors

  • Jonsson, Adam||Peterson, Martin

publication date

  • April 2020