Consequentialism in infinite worlds Academic Article

abstract

• Abstract We show that in infinite worlds the following three conditions are incompatible: (1) The spatiotemporal ordering of individuals is morally irrelevant. (2) All else being equal, the act of bringing about a good outcome with a high probability is better than the act of bringing about the same outcome with a low probability. (3) One act is better than another only if there is a nonzero probability that it brings about a better outcome. The impossibility of combining these conditions shows that it is more costly to endorse (1) than has been previously acknowledged.

authors

• Peterson, Martin

published proceedings

• ANALYSIS

author list (cited authors)

• Jonsson, A., & Peterson, M.

citation count

• 5

complete list of authors

• Jonsson, Adam||Peterson, Martin

publication date

• April 2020

publisher

• Oxford University Press (OUP)  Publisher

published in

• Analysis  Journal

keywords

• Anonymity
• Consequentialism
• Expansionism
• Infinite Utility

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1093/analys/anz078

start page

• 240

end page

• 248

volume

• 80

issue

• 2

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz078