Political pressure and regulatory control Academic Article

abstract

• Conclusions of previous regulatory studies addressing the impact of fines on firm's behavior are contradictory. A simple game theoretic model is developed which uses continuous payoff functions to reconcile these contradictory conclusions. The game suggests changing the fine shifts the reaction functions of both the regulatory agency and the firm. The nature of such shifts are partially caused by political pressure different interest groups place on regulatory agencies. Competing goals within the agency also help explain why such shifts occur.

authors

• Mjelde, James

published proceedings

• PUBLIC CHOICE

author list (cited authors)

• Chang, C. C., Mjelde, J. W., & Ozuna, T.

citation count

• 1

complete list of authors

• Chang, CC||Mjelde, JW||Ozuna, T

publication date

• December 1998

publisher

• Springer Nature  Publisher

published in

• Public Choice  Journal

keywords

• 38 Economics
• 3801 Applied Economics
• 44 Human Society

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1023/A:1004996031795

start page

• 687

end page

• 700

volume

• 97

issue

• 4

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/a:1004996031795