Simultaneous versus sequential public good provision and the role of refunds - An experimental study
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We experimentally study contributing behavior to a threshold public good under simultaneous and sequential voluntary contribution mechanisms and investigate how refund policies interact with the mechanism. We find that, for a given refund rule, efficiency is greater under a sequential contribution mechanism than under a simultaneous contribution mechanism. Furthermore, for a given order of contributions, we find that full refund unambiguously achieves higher efficiency in the simultaneous mechanism while this is not the case in the sequential mechanism. 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
author list (cited authors)
Coats, J. C., Gronberg, T. J., & Grosskopf, B.
complete list of authors
Coats, Jennifer C||Gronberg, Timothy J||Grosskopf, Brit