Subsidizing unit donations: matches, rebates, and discounts compared Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • AbstractAn influential result in the literature on charitable giving is that matching subsidies dominate rebate subsidies in raising funds. We investigate whether this result extends to unit donation schemes, a popular alternative form of soliciting donations. There, the donors choices are over the number of units of a charitable good to fund at a given unit price, rather than the amount of money to give. Comparing matches and rebates as well as simple discounts on the unit price, we find no evidence of dominance in our online experiment: the three subsidy types are equally effective overall. At a more disaggregated level, rebates lead to a higher likelihood of giving, while matching and discount subsidies lead to larger donations by donors. This suggests that charities using a unit donation scheme enjoy additional degrees of freedom in choosing a subsidy type. Rebates merit additional consideration if the primary goal is to attract donors.

published proceedings

  • EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS

author list (cited authors)

  • Diederich, J., Eckel, C. C., Epperson, R., Goeschl, T., & Grossman, P. J.

citation count

  • 6

complete list of authors

  • Diederich, Johannes||Eckel, Catherine C||Epperson, Raphael||Goeschl, Timo||Grossman, Philip J

publication date

  • April 2022