Information asymmetry, trade, and drilling: evidence from an oil lease lottery Academic Article

abstract

• AbstractWe exploit a government oil lease lottery that randomly assigned leases to individuals and firms. We examine how initial misallocation affected trade, drilling, and production outcomes. When parcels are far from existing production, leases won by individuals have similar drilling and production outcomes as those won by firms. However, for parcels close to existing production, we find that leases are about 50% less likely to be drilled when they are won by firms. We find evidence that information asymmetries drive theseresults.

authors

• Lewis, Eric

published proceedings

• RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS

author list (cited authors)

• Brehm, P. A., & Lewis, E.

citation count

• 2

complete list of authors

• Brehm, Paul A||Lewis, Eric

publication date

• September 2021

publisher

• Wiley  Publisher

published in

• RAND Journal of Economics  Journal

keywords

• 38 Economics
• 3801 Applied Economics

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1111/1756-2171.12381

start page

• 496

end page

• 514

volume

• 52

issue

• 3

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12381