Trojan Detection and Side-channel Analyses for Cyber-security in Cyber-physical Manufacturing Systems Conference Paper uri icon

abstract

  • As the maliciousness and frequency of cyber-attacks continues to grow, the safety and security of cyber-physical critical infrastructures, such as manufacturing, is quickly becoming a significant concern across the globe. Outside of traditional intellectual property theft, attacks against manufacturing systems pose a threat to maintaining a product's design intent. More specifically, such attacks can alter a manufacturing system to produce a part incorrectly; resulting in impaired functionalities or reduced performance. Manufacturing systems rely heavily upon the use of quality control systems to detect quality losses and to ensure the continued production of high-quality parts. However, quality control systems are not designed to detect the effects of malicious attacks and are ill-suited to act as a cyber-security measure for many manufacturing systems. Therefore, this paper presents a novel product/process design approach to enable real-time attack detections to supplement the shortcomings of quality control systems. The proposed approach, inspired by side-channel schemes used to detect Trojans (foreign malicious logic) in integrated circuits, aims at detecting changes to a manufactured part's intrinsic behavior through the use of structural health monitoring techniques.

name of conference

  • 43rd North American Manufacturing Research Conference, NAMRC 43, 8-12 June 2015, UNC Charlotte, North Carolina, United States

published proceedings

  • Procedia Manufacturing

altmetric score

  • 3

author list (cited authors)

  • Vincent, H., Wells, L., Tarazaga, P., & Camelio, J.

citation count

  • 45

complete list of authors

  • Vincent, Hannah||Wells, Lee||Tarazaga, Pablo||Camelio, Jaime

publication date

  • January 2015