Non-conceptual content: From perceptual experience to sub-personal computational states Academic Article uri icon

abstract

  • Abstract: Philosophers have often argued that ascriptions of content are appropriate only to the personal level states of folk psychology. Against this, this paper defends the view that the familiar propositional attitudes and states defined over them are part of a larger set of cognitive processes that do not make constitutive reference to concept possession. It does this by showing that states with nonconceptual content exist both in perceptual experience and in subpersonal informationprocessing systems. What makes these states contentinvolving is their satisfaction of certain basic conditions deriving from a general account of representationdriven behaviour that is neutral on the question of concept possession. It is also argued that creatures can be in states with nonconceptual content even though they possess no conceptual abilities at all.

published proceedings

  • MIND & LANGUAGE

author list (cited authors)

  • Bermudez, J. L.

citation count

  • 105

complete list of authors

  • Bermudez, JL

publication date

  • December 1995

publisher