Defending intentionalist accounts of self-deception Academic Article

abstract

• This commentary defends intentionalist accounts of self-deception against Mele by arguing that: (1) viewing self-deception on the model of other-deception is not as paradoxical as Mele makes out; (2) the paradoxes are not entailed by the view that self-deception is intentional; and (3) there are two problems for Mele's theory that only an intentionalist theory can solve.

authors

• Bermúdez, Jose

published proceedings

• BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES

author list (cited authors)

• Bermudez, J. L.

citation count

• 14

complete list of authors

• Bermudez, JL

publication date

• March 1997

publisher

• Cambridge University Press (CUP)  Publisher

published in

• Behavioral and Brain Sciences  Journal

keywords

• 32 Biomedical And Clinical Sciences
• 3209 Neurosciences
• 52 Psychology
• 5202 Biological Psychology
• 5204 Cognitive And Computational Psychology

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1017/S0140525X97270032

start page

• 107

end page

• &

volume

• 20

issue

• 1

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x97270032