Truth, Indefinite Extensibility, and Fitch's Paradox Chapter uri icon

abstract

  • AbstractThis chapter argues that the Dummett (2001) position is well-motivated. The position restricts the knowability principle to atomic statements, and defines intuitionistic truth inductively from there. An instructive account of Dummett's development in (1990) and (1996) is offered. There Dummett attempts to clarify the notion of indefinite extensibility of such concepts as set, natural number, and real number, and argues that only intuitionistic logic can illuminate a proper understanding of the notion. If this is correct, then the Dummett (2001) theory of truth is well-motivated, and so, we have a principled solution to the knowability paradox.

author list (cited authors)

  • Bermdez, J. L.

citation count

  • 1

complete list of authors

  • Bermúdez, José Luis

Book Title

  • New Essays on the Knowability Paradox

publication date

  • June 2009