Bodily Ownership, Bodily Awareness, and Knowledge without Observation Chapter

Fredrique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership. She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombes various discussions of what she terms knowledge without observation. De Vignemont is not convinced and appeals to the Rubber Hand Illusion to undercut my appeal to Anscombe. Section 1 of this article restates the case against the putative quale of ownership. Section 2 explains why de Vignemonts objections miss the mark. Section 3 discusses in more detail how to draw a principled distinction between bodily awareness and ordinary perceptual awareness.