First Person Thoughts: Shareability and Symmetry Academic Article

abstract

• Victor Verdejos paper On Having the Same First Person Thoughts introduces an interesting and fruitful framework for applying the type-token distinction to first person thoughts. He draws a three-way distinction between types, instantiable types, and instantiated types, and uses that distinction to open up a conceptual space for the possibility of shareable first person thoughts. This note distinguishes two types of interpersonal shareability and argues that Verdejos suggestions about instantiable types can only secure shareability of the first kind, but not the second. The author then shows how his own account of what he terms the token-sense of I (Bermdez 2011 and 2017) succeeds in making possible this second type of interpersonal shareability, despite the criticisms in Verdejos paper.

authors

• Bermúdez, Jose

published proceedings

• GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN
• Grazer Philosophische Studien

altmetric score

• 1

author list (cited authors)

• Bermudez, J. L.

citation count

• 0

complete list of authors

• Bermúdez, José Luis

publication date

• November 2019

publisher

• Brill Academic Publishers  Publisher

published in

• Grazer Philosophische Studien: International Journal for Analytic Philosophy  Journal

keywords

• First Person Thought
• Frege's Criterion
• Sense
• Shareability
• Token-sense
• Type-sense

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1163/18756735-000088

start page

• 629

end page

• 638

volume

• 96

issue

• 4

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000088