Partial Ownership For The Public Firm And Competition Academic Article

abstract

• This paper investigates the issue of partial ownership (partial privatization) of a stateowned public enterprise. We elaborate on the framework of Matsumura (1998) by allowing for managerial inefficiency, and show that under moderate conditions partial ownership is a reasonable choice of government in a monopoly market as well as in a mixed duopoly market, where a public firm competes with a profit-maximizing private firm. We also provide some economic rationale on the result that neither full privatization nor full nationalization is optimum.

authors

• Hwang, Haeshin

published proceedings

• The Japanese Economic Review

author list (cited authors)

• Lee, S., & Hwang, H.

citation count

• 36

complete list of authors

• Lee, Sang‐Ho||Hwang, Hae‐Shin

publication date

• September 2003

publisher

• Springer Nature  Publisher

published in

• Japanese Economic Review  Journal

keywords

• 38 Economics
• 3801 Applied Economics

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1111/1468-5876.00261

start page

• 324

end page

• 335

volume

• 54

issue

• 3

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-5876.00261