THE POLITICAL INCENTIVE EXPLANATION OF DEMOCRATIC PEACE - EVIDENCE FROM EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH Academic Article

abstract

• In this paper, we summarize a series of experimental studies that show that democracies dont fight each other because their leaders have very few political incentives to do so. The use of force against other democracies is perceived by the public and by leaders of democratic states as a failure of foreign policy. The reliance of democratic leaders on public support decreases therefore the likelihood of the use of force against other democracies. 1993, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. All rights reserved.

authors

• Geva, Nehemia

published proceedings

• INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS

author list (cited authors)

• GEVA, N., DEROUEN, K. R., & MINTZ, A.

citation count

• 30

complete list of authors

• GEVA, N||DEROUEN, KR||MINTZ, A

publication date

• January 1993

publisher

• Taylor & Francis  Publisher

published in

• International Interactions  Journal

keywords

• DEMOCRATIC PEACE
• EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
• Politics

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1080/03050629308434805

start page

• 215

end page

• 229

volume

• 18

issue

• 3

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629308434805

user-defined tag

• 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions