STRATEGIC NON-INTERVENTION AND THE CHOICE OF TRADE-POLICY FOR INTERNATIONAL OLIGOPOLY Academic Article

abstract

• This paper analyzes a game of strategic trade policy between governments who may choose among quantity controls, subsidies, and non-intervention as policy instruments. Central to the analysis is our view of non-intervention as a distinct policy choice. We derive conditions under which non-intervention is strictly preferred to the alternative instruments. Preferences between non-intervention and the Nash equilibrium subsidy confirm to a simple distance measure involving the Stackelberg leadership subsidy; the subsidy level (zero or Nash) that is closest to the Stackelberg subsidy being preferred. 1993.

authors

• Hwang, Haeshin
• Schulman, Craig

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

author list (cited authors)

• HWANG, H. S., & SCHULMAN, C. T.

citation count

• 23

complete list of authors

• HWANG, HS||SCHULMAN, CT

publication date

• February 1993

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Journal of International Economics  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/0022-1996(93)90067-8

start page

• 73

end page

• 93

volume

• 34

issue

• 1-2

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-1996(93)90067-8