Are incentives against economic justice? Academic Article

abstract

• We consider the problem of fairly allocating a social endowment of indivisible goods and money when the domain of admissible preferences contains, but is not restricted to, quasi-linear preferences. We analyze the manipulability of the Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair (GMRF) solutions. (i) We show that the Nash and strong Nash equilibrium correspondences of the "preference revelation game form" associated with each GMRF solution coincide with the no-envy solution (in equilibrium, efficiency is preserved according to agents' true preferences). (ii) A corollary is that the GMRF solutions "naturally implement" the no-envy solution in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. 2010 Elsevier Inc.

authors

• Velez, Rodrigo

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY

author list (cited authors)

• Velez, R. A.

citation count

• 16

complete list of authors

• Velez, Rodrigo A

publication date

• January 2011

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Economic Theory  Journal

keywords

• Efficiency
• Fairness
• Generalized Money Rawlsian Fair Solutions
• Implementation
• Indivisible Goods
• MECHANISM DESIGN
• Manipulation
• No-envy

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.005

start page

• 326

end page

• 345

volume

• 146

issue

• 1

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.10.005