Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange Academic Article

abstract

• We characterize the family of efficient, consistent, and strategy-proof rules in house allocation problems. These rules follow an endowment inheritance and trade procedure as in Ppai's hierarchical exchange rules (Ppai in Econometrica 68, 1403- 1433, 2000) and closely resemble Ergin's priority rules (Ergin in Econometrica 70, 2489-2497, 2002). We prove that if there are at least four objects, these are the only rules that are efficient in two-agent problems, 2-consistent, and strategy-proof. A corollary is that these three basic properties together imply the full requirements of efficiency, consistency, group strategy-proofness, and reallocation-proofness. 2013 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.

authors

• Velez, Rodrigo

published proceedings

• ECONOMIC THEORY

author list (cited authors)

• Velez, R. A.

citation count

• 11

complete list of authors

• Velez, Rodrigo A

publication date

• May 2014

publisher

• Springer Nature  Publisher

published in

• Economic Theory  Journal

keywords

• Consistency
• Consistent Hierarchical Exchange Rules
• Group Strategy-proofness
• Hierarchical Exchange Rules
• Reallocation-proofness
• Strategy-proofness

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1007/s00199-013-0774-y

start page

• 125

end page

• 156

volume

• 56

issue

• 1

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0774-y