RATIO-LINDAHL EQUILIBRIA AND AN INFORMATIONALLY EFFICIENT AND IMPLEMENTABLE MIXED-OWNERSHIP SYSTEM Academic Article

abstract

• In this paper, we formalize an informationally efficient and implementable mixed-ownership economic institutional framework by using the Ratio-Lindahl equilibrium that yields Pareto-efficient and individually rational allocations for public goods economies with general variable returns. We consider the incentive aspects of the system by giving an "incentive-compatible," informationally efficient, and "privacy preserving" mechanism whose Nash allocations coincide with Ratio-Lindahl allocations. Moreover, the mechanism is "well-behaved" in the sense that it uses an individually feasible, balanced, and continuous outcome function and further, has a message space of minimal dimension. 1995.

authors

• Li, Qi
• Tian, Guoqiang

published proceedings

• JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION

author list (cited authors)

• TIAN, G. Q., & LI, Q.

citation count

• 2

complete list of authors

• TIAN, GQ||LI, Q

publication date

• May 1995

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization  Journal

keywords

• INCENTIVE
• Information
• MECHANISM DESIGN
• MIXED-OWNERSHIP SYSTEM
• RATIO-LINDAHL EQUILIBRIUM

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1016/0167-2681(94)00045-G

start page

• 391

end page

• 411

volume

• 26

issue

• 3

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(94)00045-g