Continuous and Feasible Implementation of Rational-Expectations Lindahl Allocations Academic Article

abstract

• In this paper we consider Bayesian implementation of rational-expectations Lindahl allocations for economic environments with public goods when agents are incompletely informed about environments. We construct a continuous and feasible mechanism whose Bayesian equilibrium allocations coincide with rational-expectations Lindahl allocations. We not only allow the types of individuals to be unknown but also allow both the preferences and the initial endowments to be unknown to the designer. In addition, we allow some types of boundary equilibrium allocations and a continuous information structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72, D71, D82, H41. 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

authors

• Tian, Guoqiang

published proceedings

• Games and Economic Behavior

author list (cited authors)

• Tian, G.

citation count

• 8

complete list of authors

• Tian, Guoqiang

publication date

• January 1996

publisher

• Elsevier  Publisher

published in

• Games and Economic Behavior  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1006/game.1996.0079

start page

• 135

end page

• 151

volume

• 16

issue

• 1

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0079