Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations Academic Article uri icon


  • This paper considers Nash implementation and double implementation of Pareto efficient allocations for production economies. We allow production sets and preferences are unknown to the planner. We present a well-behaved mechanism that fully implements Pareto efficient allocations in Nash equilibrium. The mechanism then is modified to fully doubly implement Pareto efficient allocations in Nash and strong Nash equilibria. The mechanisms constructed in the paper have many nice properties such as feasibility and continuity. In addition, they use finite-dimensional message spaces. Furthermore, the mechanism works not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies. 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

published proceedings

  • Journal of Mathematical Economics

author list (cited authors)

  • Tian, G.

citation count

  • 1

complete list of authors

  • Tian, Guoqiang

publication date

  • January 2009