ON THE EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIA IN GENERALIZED GAMES Academic Article

abstract

• This paper deals with the existence of equilibrium in generalized games (the so-called abstract economies) and Nash equilibrium in games with general assumptions. Preference correspondences, unlike the existing theorems in the literature, need not have open graphs or open lower sections, strategy spaces need not be compact and finite dimensional, the number of agents need not be countable, and preference relations need not be ordered. Thus, our results generalize many of the existence theorems on equilibria in generalized games, including those of Debreu (1952), Shafer and Sonnenschein (1975), Toussaint (1984), Kim and Richter (1986), and Yannelis (1987). 1992 Physica-Verlag.

authors

• Tian, Guoqiang

published proceedings

• INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY

author list (cited authors)

• TIAN, G.

citation count

• 13

complete list of authors

• TIAN, G

publication date

• September 1992

publisher

• Springer Nature  Publisher

published in

• International Journal of Game Theory  Journal

keywords

• 38 Economics
• 3801 Applied Economics
• 3803 Economic Theory
• 49 Mathematical Sciences
• 4904 Pure Mathematics

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1007/BF01253779

start page

• 247

end page

• 254

volume

• 20

issue

• 3

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01253779