When electoral and party institutions interact to produce Caudillo politics: The case of Honduras Academic Article uri icon


  • This article examines how electoral and party institutions can interact to perpetuate caudillo politics within a democratic regime. Caudillo politics describes a political system in which patron-client relationships dominate, and patronage is the currency of politics. Examination of the Honduran case shows that, because of the incentive structure created by the interaction of fused elections and factionalized parties, the system does not perform either policy or representation functions. This type of system is neither an 'efficient secret' or an 'inefficient secret', but rather just plain inefficient. As such, its impact on popular faith in democracy is negative, as people come to view politics and the government as a source of patronage resources and not as a forum for discussing and addressing the country's problems. Copyright 1996 Elsevier Science Ltd.

published proceedings


altmetric score

  • 3

author list (cited authors)

  • Taylor, M. M.

citation count

  • 30

complete list of authors

  • Taylor, MM

publication date

  • January 1996