FORMAL VERSUS INFORMAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURES AND LEGISLATOR BEHAVIOR - EVIDENCE FROM COSTA-RICA

This study investigates why legislators perform constituency service in a political system where such behavior would not be predicted because of a formal electoral structure that prohibits reelection and chooses legislators through proportional representation. Research about constituency service in the U.S. Congress has found that it is the formal structure of the U.S. electoral system that induces this behavior. Members of Congress can be reelected and they perceive their own actions, not those of their party, as the primary determinant of whether they will win their reelection bid. In Costa Rica, however, parties have been able to capitalize on the limitations placed on legislator reelection and use it to their advantage for inducing representatives to engage in constituency service, a behavior desired by the parties. Because legislators cannot be reelected, if they want to pursue a further career in politics they must curry the favor of their party, which can help them get coveted appointive positions in the executive branch. Part of earning party favor is delivering constituency service and pork to their constituents. 1992, Southern Political Science Association. All rights reserved.

FORMAL VERSUS INFORMAL INCENTIVE STRUCTURES AND LEGISLATOR BEHAVIOR - EVIDENCE FROM COSTA-RICA Academic Article