Estimation of competitive conduct when firms are efficiently colluding: addressing the Corts critique Academic Article

abstract

• I address a recent critique by Corts (1999) who finds that traditional approaches in New Empirical Industrial Organization to estimate the competitive conduct in an oligopoly market can yield inconsistent estimates of the conduct parameter if firms are engaged in efficient collusion. This article derives a general empirical model that allows consistent estimation of the conduct parameter that is robust to efficient collusion. 2009 Taylor & Francis.

authors

• Puller, Steven

published proceedings

• APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS

author list (cited authors)

• Puller, S. L.

citation count

• 24

complete list of authors

• Puller, Steven L

publication date

• January 2009

publisher

• Taylor & Francis  Publisher

published in

• Applied Economics Letters  Journal

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1080/13504850701578900

start page

• 1497

end page

• 1500

volume

• 16

issue

• 15

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13504850701578900