The dynamics of senatorial representation, 1952-1991
Academic Article
Overview
Identity
Additional Document Info
Other
View All
Overview
abstract
We propose a dynamic model of representation that posits that representatives adapt through time to minimize the distance between policy choices and constituent, global, and personal preferences. Several hypotheses flow from the dynamic model: (1) equilibria develop through time in senator policy choice; (2) representatives adapt through time to global, as well as constituent preferences; (3) the manner in which adaptation occurs depends on the strength of the representative's personal ideology; (4) the manner in which adaptation occurs depends on various measures of constituency efficiency. We use pooled time-series cross-section analysis of covariance techniques to evaluate the preceding hypotheses. The analysis shows that senators integrate constituent, global, and personal preferences. Equilibria exist through time in Senator Policy Liberalism. Adaptation to and from the equilibria depends on global and constituent preferences and efficiency. The manner of adaptation also depends on the strength of the representative's ideology and the efficiency of the constituency.
