A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms Academic Article

abstract

• This paper provides two theorems which characterize the domains of valuation functions for which there exist Pareto efficient and truth dominant strategy mechanisms (balanced Groves mechanisms). Theorem 1 characterizes the existence of balanced Groves mechanisms for a general class of valuation functions. Theorem 2 provides new balance-permitting domains of valuation functions by reducing the problem of solving partial differential equations to the problem of solving a polynomial function. It shows that a balanced Groves mechanism exists if and only if each valuation function in the family under consideration can be obtained by solving a polynomial function with order less than n -1, where n is the number of individuals. Springer-Verlag 1999.

authors

• Tian, Guoqiang

published proceedings

• Review of Economic Design

author list (cited authors)

• Liu, L., & Tian, G.

citation count

• 13

complete list of authors

• Liu, Liqun||Tian, Guoqiang

publication date

• January 1999

publisher

• Springer Nature  Publisher

published in

• Review of Economic Design  Journal

keywords

• C72
• D71
• D82
• Dominant Strategy Implementation
• Groves Mechanisms
• H41

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

• 10.1007/s100580050034

start page

• 205

end page

• 218

volume

• 4

issue

• 3

URL

• http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s100580050034