A characterization of the existenceof optimal dominant strategy mechanisms Academic Article uri icon


  • This paper provides two theorems which characterize the domains of valuation functions for which there exist Pareto efficient and truth dominant strategy mechanisms (balanced Groves mechanisms). Theorem 1 characterizes the existence of balanced Groves mechanisms for a general class of valuation functions. Theorem 2 provides new balance-permitting domains of valuation functions by reducing the problem of solving partial differential equations to the problem of solving a polynomial function. It shows that a balanced Groves mechanism exists if and only if each valuation function in the family under consideration can be obtained by solving a polynomial function with order less than n -1, where n is the number of individuals. Springer-Verlag 1999.

published proceedings

  • Review of Economic Design

author list (cited authors)

  • Liu, L., & Tian, G.

citation count

  • 13

complete list of authors

  • Liu, Liqun||Tian, Guoqiang

publication date

  • January 1999